The Normative Role of Knowledge

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0. Introduction

A growing trend in contemporary epistemology is to approach questions about the nature and value of knowledge by way of considerations about its normative role. For example, various philosophers have recently proposed that knowledge is normatively required for assertion and action. Here are some representative statements:

One must: assert \( p \) only if one knows \( p \). (Williamson 2000: 243)

One must know that \( p \) in order to be well-enough positioned with respect to \( p \) to assert it. (DeRose 2002: 179)

One ought only to use that which one knows as a premise in one’s deliberations. (Hawthorne 2004: 30)

One should act only on what one knows. (Stanley 2005: 9)

Such claims promise to cast light on the nature and value of knowledge. If knowledge plays an important normative role, then we can appeal to this fact in explaining why knowledge is worth caring about. It also constrains, theories of the nature of knowledge, since we can ask what knowledge must be like in order to play its normative role. In the recent literature, for instance, claims about the normative role of knowledge have played a major role in debates over contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism and more traditional forms of insensitive invariantism.\(^1\) However, this paper has the more limited aim of understanding the normative role of knowledge, while remaining neutral on further questions about its wider implications for these debates.
In this paper, I argue that knowledge plays an important normative role in assertion and action, which is explained and unified by its more fundamental normative role in belief. Moreover, I propose a distinctive account of what this normative role consists in. I argue that knowledge is the aim of belief, which sets a normative standard of correctness and a corresponding normative standard of justification. According to my proposal, it is correct to believe, assert and act on a proposition if and only if one is in a position to know it. By contrast, one has justification to believe, assert and act on a proposition if and only if one has justification to believe that one is in a position to know it.

The overall plan for the paper is as follows: (1) I begin by sketching the intuitive data that support a normative role for knowledge in assertion and action. I go on to argue that there are intuitive counterexamples to the K Rule, which says that one has justification to assert and to act on P if and only if one is in a position to know that P. (2) I argue that the best explanation of all of the intuitive data is given by the JK Rule, which says that one has justification to assert and to act on P if and only if one has justification to believe that one is in a position to know that P. (3) I argue that cases of “radical ignorance”, which provide apparent counterexamples to both the K Rule and the JK Rule, can be explained away as cases in which one has justification to assert and to act on one’s high degree of confidence. (4) I argue for a functional distinction between belief and high confidence on which belief plays a distinctive functional role in reasoning. (5) I argue for a normative distinction between belief and high confidence on which belief is subject to the JK Rule, whereas high confidence is not. (6) I argue that the JK Rule for belief is best explained by an analogue of the K Rule, which says that it is correct to believe that P if and only if one is in a position to know that P. I conclude that knowledge is the aim of belief.

1. The K Rule

Suppose that I hold a single ticket in a large lottery in which there is just one winner. We may assume that the draw has already taken place and that in fact I did not win, although the result has not yet been announced. Intuitively, I am not in a position to know that I did not win the lottery, although I am in a position to know that I probably did not win. Moreover, this explains further features of the case. Williamson (2000: 246) observes that while I have justification to assert that I probably did not win, I lack justification to assert that I did not win. Similarly, Hawthorne (2004: 29) observes that while I have justification to act on the assumption that I probably did not win, I lack justification to act on the assumption that I did not win. For example, it would be illegitimate to act on the basis of the following reasoning: my ticket did not win, so if I keep the ticket I will gain nothing; but if I sell it I will gain something, so I had better sell the ticket. Why is it that I lack
justification to assert and to act on the assumption that I did not win? A plausible explanation is that I am not in a position to know that I did not win.

Following DeRose (1996), the lottery case may be usefully compared with a case in which I bet that the Knicks will win a basketball game, but then read in the newspaper that in fact they lost the game. For purposes of comparison, we may assume that the chance of a misprint reversing the scores is as high as the chance that my ticket wins the lottery, although there is in fact no misprint on this occasion. Intuitively, I am in a position to know by reading the newspaper that the Knicks lost the game and hence that I did not win my bet. Again, this explains further features of the case. In this case, I have justification to assert and to act on the assumption that I did not win my bet. For example, it would be legitimate to act on the following reasoning: my betting slip did not win, so if I keep it I will gain nothing; but if I sell it I will gain something, so I had better sell it. Why is it that I have justification to assert and to act on the assumption that I did not win? A plausible explanation is that I am in a position to know that I did not win.

Similar points apply to DeRose’s (1992) bank cases:

**Bank Case A.** My wife and I are driving home on a Friday afternoon. We plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit our paychecks. But as we drive past the bank, we notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons. Although we generally like to deposit our paychecks as soon as possible, it is not especially important in this case that they be deposited right away, so I suggest that we drive straight home and deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning. My wife says, ‘Maybe the bank won’t be open tomorrow. Lots of banks are closed on Saturdays.’ I reply, ‘No, I know it’ll be open. I was just there two weeks ago on Saturday. It’s open until noon.’

**Bank Case B.** My wife and I drive past the bank on a Friday afternoon, as in Case A, and notice the long lines. I again suggest that we deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning, explaining that I was at the bank on Saturday morning only two weeks ago and discovered that it was open until noon. But in this case, we have just written a very large and important check. If our paychecks are not deposited into our checking account before Monday morning, the important check we wrote will bounce, leaving us in a very bad situation. And, of course, the bank is not open on Sunday. My wife reminds me of these facts. She then says, ‘Banks do change their hours. Do you know the bank will be open tomorrow?’ Remaining as confident as I was before that the bank will be open then, still I reply, ‘Well, no. I’d better go in and make sure.’ (1992: 913)

Am I in a position to know that the bank will be open, given that in fact it will be open? Intuitively, I am in a position to know that the bank will be open in the low stakes case, but not in the high stakes case. As before, this explains further features of the case. As DeRose (2002: 177) observes, in the low stakes case, but not in the high stakes case, I have justification to assert
that the bank will be open. And likewise, as Stanley (2005: 11) observes, in
the low stakes case, but not in the high stakes case, I have justification to
act on the assumption that the bank will be open – say, to come back on
Saturday morning, rather than to wait in the long lines on Friday afternoon.
Again, a plausible explanation is that, in the low stakes case, but not in the
high stakes case, I am in a position to know that the bank will be open.

On the face of it, these intuitions are best explained by the following K
Rule:

- The K Rule: One has justification to assert and to act on P if and only if
  one is in a position to know that P

Some clarifications are needed here. First, the K Rule should be read as a
strict biconditional, which holds necessarily, rather than a material bicon-
ditional, since it is meant to apply to both actual and counterfactual cases.
Moreover, it is formulated as a biconditional, rather than a conditional, since
it is meant to explain intuitions about two different sorts of cases. On the
one hand, there are good cases, which are such that if one is in a position to
know that P, then one has justification to assert and to act on P. On the other
hand, there are bad cases, which are such that if one is not in a position to
know that P, then one lacks justification to assert and to act on P.

Second, the K Rule is designed to answer the question: what kind of
epistemic position does one need with respect to a proposition P in order
to have justification to assert or to act on P? As such, it is uniquely con-
cerned with epistemic, rather than pragmatic, dimensions of justification. 2
So, it avoids potential counterexamples in which one knows that P, but one’s
epistemic justification to assert or to act on P is outweighed by stronger prag-
matic justification not to do so. To borrow an example from Crisp (2005),
perhaps Dr. Evil threatens dire consequences if one asserts or acts on any
known proposition. In that case, if one knows that P, then one has sufficient
epistemic justification to assert and to act on P, but one has stronger prag-
matic justification not to do so, one lacks sufficient justification all things
considered.

Third, the K Rule is formulated in terms of being in a position to know,
rather than simply knowing. One is in a position to know a proposition just
in case one satisfies all the epistemic, as opposed to psychological, condi-
tions for knowledge, such as having ungettiered justification to believe a true
proposition. By contrast, one knows a proposition just in case one satisfies
not only epistemic, but also psychological, conditions for knowledge, such as
believing a true proposition on the basis of one’s ungettiered justification to
believe it. This distinction is crucial for avoiding potential counterexamples,
including Lackey’s (2007) cases of selfless assertion for instance, the cre-
ationist teacher who has sufficient justification to make assertions from evo-
lutionary theory, although she does not know evolutionary theory because
she does not even believe it. According to the K Rule, she has justification to assert evolutionary theory as long as she is in a good enough epistemic position to know it, whether or not she takes advantage of her epistemic position by believing it on the right basis.³

Proponents of the K Rule argue that it provides the best explanation of intuitions prompted by lottery cases and bank cases. Of course, one might challenge the correctness of these intuitions. For instance, insensitive invariantists tend to deny that one has knowledge in the low stakes bank case, but not in the high stakes bank case. However, they need not deny the intuitive plausibility of this claim, so long as it can be explained away as an error. Indeed, proponents of the K Rule can invoke it to explain the intuition plausibility that one has justification for assertion and action in the low stakes case, but not in the high stakes case. Thus, it may be argued that the K Rule provides the best explanation of the intuitions in question, whether or not those intuitions are correct.⁴

The question I want to consider is whether the K Rule does in fact provide the best explanation of these intuitions. For current purposes, we can remain neutral on whether the intuitive data is correct and if so, whether it supports some form of contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism or insensitive invariantism. After all, a correct understanding of the normative role of knowledge may impose substantial constraints on how these further questions are to be resolved. In what follows, I will argue against the K Rule on the grounds that it does not in fact provide the best explanation of all the intuitive data. There are intuitive counterexamples to the K Rule in which one has justification to assert and to act on P, but one is not in a position to know that P because one has justification for a belief that P which is either false or which is true, but gettiered.

2. The JK Rule

Consider the unfortunate subject, Calvin, who is traveling through fake-barn country, but who is not positioned to know that he is. Seeing a barn on the road ahead, he forms a justified, true belief that there is a barn on the road ahead. In the circumstances, he cannot know just by looking that there is a barn ahead, since he could easily have formed a false belief on the basis of looking. Intuitively, though, he is justified in asserting that there is a barn ahead and in acting on the assumption that there is a barn ahead – say, by unrolling his swag with the intention of bedding down for the night. This case, and others like it, provide intuitive counterexamples to the K Rule.

Hawthorne and Stanley (2008) respond to such cases by noting that one who violates norms of justification may be excused for doing so. Mere excusability is not sufficient for justification. For example, the effects of drugs, brainwashing or mental illness may excuse one’s violating norms of justification in the formation and maintenance of one’s beliefs. Still, matters seem
quite different in a Gettier case, such as Calvin’s. Intuitively, it is not that he violates norms of justification and is excusable for doing so. Rather, he is fully justified in believing, asserting and acting just as he does. This may be illustrated by comparing the original barn case with a revised version of the case in which Calvin learns from local sources that he is in fake-barn country. Clearly, there is an important epistemic difference here. In the original case, Calvin has a justification to assert and act on the proposition that there is a barn ahead, but in the revised case, his justification is defeated by the discovery that he is in fake-barn country. And yet the K Rule fails to explain this intuitive difference, since it entails that Calvin lacks justification in both cases.5

How should we explain the intuitive difference between the original and revised versions of the barn case? In the original case, Calvin is not positioned to know that he is in fake-barn country. In the revised case, by contrast, he knows on the basis of testimony that he is in fake-barn country. Borrowing the terminology of Sutton (2005), we can say that the original barn case is an *unknown unknown*, whereas the revised case is a *known unknown*. In light of this distinction, we might abandon the K Rule in favour of the following alternative:

- **The ¬K¬K Rule**: One has justification to assert and to act on P if and only if one is not in a position to know that one is not in a position to know that P

The ¬K¬K Rule captures an intuitive difference between the original and revised versions of the barn case. However, it makes the wrong prediction about the following variation on the revised case. Calvin is informed that he is in fake-barn country, but in fact the information is misleading, so he is not in a position to know this. Still, if he has misleading information that he is in fake-barn country, then he has justification to believe that he is. Intuitively, this is enough to defeat his justification to assert and to act on the proposition that there is a barn ahead. And yet he is not in a position to know that he is not in a position to know that there is a barn ahead. So, the case provides an intuitive counterexample to the ¬K¬K Rule.

We can give a better explanation of the intuitive difference between the original version of the barn case and these revised versions in terms of the following JK Rule:

- **The JK Rule**: One has justification to assert and to act on P if and only if one has justification to believe that one is in a position to know that P

In the original case, Calvin has justification to assert and to act on the assumption that there is a barn ahead, since he has justification to believe, although falsely, that he is in a position to know that there is a barn ahead. In each of the revised versions, by contrast, when Calvin is informed that
he is in fake-barn country, he loses his justification to believe that he is in
a position to know that there is a barn ahead. Therefore, he also loses his
justification to assert and to act on the assumption that there is a barn ahead.

The JK Rule also explains the intuitive data we began with. In the lottery
case, one lacks justification to believe that one is in a position to know that
one did not win the lottery, so one also lacks justification to assert or to act
on the assumption that one did not win. In the newspaper case, by contrast,
one has justification to believe that one is in a position to know that one
did not win the bet, so one also has justification to assert and to act on the
assumption that one did not win the bet. Likewise, in the high stakes bank
case, one lacks justification to believe that one is in a position to know that
the bank will be open, so one also lacks justification to assert or to act on
the assumption that the bank will be open. In the low stakes bank case, by
contrast, one has justification to believe that one is in a position to know
that the bank will be open, so one also has justification to assert and to act
on the assumption that the bank will be open. So, the JK Rule provides a
comprehensive and uniform explanation of all the intuitive data.

Moreover, the JK Rule explains certain conversational patterns and
Moorean phenomena, which might otherwise be taken to support the K
Rule. For instance, one’s assertion may be challenged by asking, “How do
you know that P?” or, “How can you know that P?” The JK Rule explains
why this challenge is a good one, since one has justification to assert that P
only if one has justification to believe that one knows, or is in a good enough
epistemic position to know, that P. Arguably, the JK Rule provides a better
explanation than the K Rule, since it is sufficient to respond to this challenge
by making the case that one has justification to believe that one’s epistemic
position is good enough for knowledge, whether or not one happens to be
mistaken. Moreover, the JK Rule also explains what is wrong with asserting
Moorean conjunctions of the form, “P and I am not in a position to know
that P”. After all, one has justification to assert the conjunction only if one
has justification to assert both conjuncts. But one cannot have justification
to believe that one is in a position to know both conjuncts, since this entails
the implausible result that one has justification to believe a contradiction:
that one is and one is not in a position to know that P.

It may be objected that the JK Rule imposes overly demanding psycho-
logical requirements on the justification of assertion and action. In fact,
however, the JK Rule does not impose any psychological requirements at all.
In particular, there is no requirement that one has the concept of knowledge
as a necessary condition for having justification for assertion and action.
Two points are crucial here. First, the JK Rule is formulated in terms of
propositional justification, which is a purely epistemic matter of having jus-
tification to believe a proposition, rather than doxastic justification, which
is a psychological matter of taking advantage of one’s justification by form-
ing a justified belief on its basis. And second, I deny that there are any
psychological constraints on which propositions one has justification to believe. Therefore, one may have justification to believe a proposition even if one lacks the psychological capacities, including the conceptual capacities, which are required to take advantage of one’s justification in forming a doxastically justified belief.

It is sometimes assumed that there are psychological constraints on propositional justification. But why assume this? An influential line of argument appeals to a deontological conception of justification as a source of epistemic obligations, which apply only insofar as one has the psychological capacities required to discharge them. Roughly, the line of argument is that if one has justification to believe a proposition, then one ought to believe it, but one ought to believe it only if one can do so. However, there are counterexamples, as we have already seen, in which the effects of drugs, brainwashing or mental illness render one psychologically incapable of taking advantage of what one has justification to believe. In such a case, one’s psychological limitations provide an excuse, so one cannot be blamed or held responsible for one’s epistemic failing. But while considerations of responsibility and blameworthiness may be sensitive to one’s psychological limitations, there are no corresponding psychological constraints on which propositions one has justification to believe.\footnote{9}

3. Radical Ignorance

Cases of “radical ignorance” present apparent counterexamples to the necessity of the K Rule and the JK Rule alike. These are cases in which one plausibly has justification to assert or to act on a proposition, although one is not in a position to know it and one lacks justification to believe that one is in a position to know it. To illustrate, consider the following pair of cases:

Assertion: Suppose I am watching a basketball game between the Knicks and the Bulls, which is about to begin. My friend asserts that the Bulls are going to win, but I reply that they will lose, and we proceed to strike up a bet. In this case, I know that I am not in a position to know the result of the game in advance. However, I have background information about the team that provides me with justification to be reasonably confident that the Bulls will lose. Am I not in a good enough epistemic position to be justified in asserting what I do?

Action: Suppose I need to get a book for a project I am working on. I could go to the library or to the bookstore, but there is not enough time to do both and so I act on the assumption that the book is in the library. In this case, I know that I am not in a position to know that the library has the book. However, I have background information that provides me with justification to be reasonably confident that the library has the book. Am I not in a strong enough epistemic position to be justified in acting as I do?
Hawthorne (2004: 30) and Stanley (2005: 10) propose a strategy for responding to these cases of radical ignorance. In defence of the K Rule, they insist that if I am not in a position to know that $P$, then I do not have justification to assert or to act on the proposition that $P$. But they point out that I may have justification to assert or to act on the proposition that $P$ is probable, so long as I am in a position to know that $P$ is probable. A version of this strategy may be co-opted by proponents of the JK Rule. According to the JK Rule, if I lack justification to believe that I am in a position to know that $P$, then I lack justification to assert or to act on $P$. But I may have justification to act on the proposition that $P$ is probable, so long as I have justification to believe that I am in a position to know that $P$ is probable. Still, it remains to be seen whether this strategy provides an adequate redescription of cases of radical ignorance. In what follows, I raise some difficulties that motivate an alternative approach.

To begin with the case of action: is every case of radical ignorance a case in which one has justification to act on the proposition that $P$ is probable, but not the proposition that $P$? This seems like an over-intellectualization, since cannot act on one’s justification to believe that $P$ is probable unless one has the concept of probability. By contrast, one does not need any concept of probability in order to act on one’s justification to have a high degree of confidence in the proposition that $P$. The point is not just that one might lack the mathematical concepts employed in the probability calculus or the relatively technical concepts employed in the philosophical analysis of probability. All that is need for a rudimentary grasp of the concept of probability is some minimal capacity to reason with probabilities. However, it is one thing to be capable of reasoning with probabilities, but it is another thing for one’s degrees of confidence to play a role in explaining one’s behaviour. One’s behaviour may be causally sensitive to one’s degrees of confidence, whether or not one is capable of reasoning about one’s degrees of confidence and articulating them in terms of any concept of probability.

In the following passage, Richard Jeffrey invokes a notion of probability in the context of explaining the behaviour of laboratory rats:

A laboratory rat who sees nothing to choose between two food pellets must press lever A or lever B in order to prevent pellet A or pellet B from dropping out of reach while the bell is sounding. It sees pellet A as less likely than B to remain accessible after lever pressure prevents immediate disappearance, having seen pellets in each place disappear randomly, throughout its conditioning, with disappearance rates A and B set at $3/2$... Where $p$ and $q$ are the propositions that the rat eats pellet A and eats pellet B, the rat is indifferent between $p$ and $q$, but prefers $\neg q$ to $\neg p$, i.e. prefers losing access to the pellet he thinks less likely to go away. This pattern of preference indicates that the rat judges $p$ to be more probable than $q$, even though he has no explicit concept of subjective probability. (1986: 484)
What explains why the rat prefers \( \neg Q \) to \( \neg P \), despite being indifferent between \( P \) and \( Q \)? According to Jeffrey, the rat judges that \( P \) is more probable than \( Q \). However, as Jeffrey himself acknowledges, the rat has no explicit concept of probability; indeed, without some capacity to reason with probabilities, it is not plausible to suppose that the rat has any concept of probability, whether explicit or otherwise. But without any concept of probability, the rat is unable to judge or to act on the proposition that \( P \) is more probable than \( Q \). Nevertheless, we can explain the rat’s behaviour in terms of the claim that its degree of confidence in \( P \) is greater than its degree of confidence in \( Q \), despite the fact that its degrees of confidence are not articulated in terms of any concept of probability. And since the rat has justification to act on these degrees of confidence, the case provides an apparent counterexample to the K Rule and the JK Rule alike.

Hawthorne and Stanley (2008) reply to the charge of over-intellectualization by claiming that even if one lacks the concept of probability, one can always act on other propositions in one’s total body of knowledge in virtue of which it is probable that \( P \). Here, the relevant notion of probability is *epistemic* probability, which is determined by one’s total body of knowledge. On this view, when it is epistemically probable that \( P \), there will be other propositions in one’s total body of knowledge in virtue of which it is epistemically probable that \( P \). So, one may be capable of acting on the propositions in virtue of which it is epistemically probable that \( P \) even if one lacks the concept of epistemic probability, as in the following example:

> When I act upon my knowledge that it is reasonably likely that the restaurant is on the left, it would also be apt for me to act upon my knowledge of those propositions that make for a high epistemic chance of the proposition that the restaurant is on the left. Thus for example, when confronted with a fork in the road, I might turn left because (a) it is epistemically more likely that the restaurant is on the left or instead because (b) three out of five people told me that the restaurant is on the left. (2008: 584)

Returning to the laboratory rats, the claim would be that when the rat presses one of the levers, it acts not on the proposition that \( P \) is more probable than \( Q \), but rather on some other known proposition in virtue of which \( P \) is more probable than \( Q \), such as the proposition that pellet A has a higher rate of disappearance than B. However, this too is an over-intellectualization. Why must the rat have any beliefs or knowledge about the rate of disappearance, so long as it adjusts its degrees of confidence in a way that is sensitive to the rate of disappearance? After all, it might simply adjust its degrees of confidence in a way that is sensitive to the evidence without believing, and so without knowing, the propositions that constitute its evidence. This threatens to undermine Hawthorne and Stanley’s assumption that the evidence which determines the epistemic probability of a proposition always consists...
in propositions that one knows. After all, there seems to be a useful conception of epistemic probability on which one has justification to be confident that $P$ to degree $n$ if and only if it is epistemically probable that $P$ to degree $n$. However, it is not clear that one must have beliefs or knowledge about the evidence that provides one with justification to be confident that $P$ to degree $n$.

Turning now to the case of assertion: is every case of radical ignorance a case in which one has justification to assert the proposition that $P$ is probable, but not the proposition that $P$? In many contexts, it may be more reasonable for me to say, “The Bulls will probably lose,” rather than simply, “The Bulls will lose”. However, this is not obviously true in all contexts. For example, in the context of discussing the outcome of a basketball game that is about to begin, it may be common knowledge between us that neither of us knows in advance what the result of the game will be. In that case, we are not disposed to interpret one another as knowing what we say, in which case it would be needlessly pedantic to hedge our assertions by explicitly qualifying them using the notion of probability. If so, it may be perfectly reasonable for me to say, “The Bulls will lose”, rather than to qualify this by saying, “The Bulls will probably lose”. However, it is not clear that Hawthorne and Stanley’s proposal can explain this.

One might deny that in such a case we are making genuine assertions as opposed to speech acts of some other kind. Thus, one might follow Williamson in drawing a distinction between the speech act of assertion and the speech act of conjecture: “There is, for example, a speech act of conjecturing $P$, for which the evidential norms are more relaxed than they are for assertion” (2000: 244). Which speech act we are performing is typically left implicit, as a matter to be determined by context, although we sometimes make things more explicit by prefacing our claims with the words “I conjecture that . . .” or “I assert that . . .”. So, perhaps we can appeal to this distinction in order to explain away the apparent counterexamples as cases of conjecture, rather than assertion. The problem with this strategy, as Weiner (2005) observes, is that it threatens to trivialize claims about the norms that govern assertion. If we simply define ‘assertion’ as the speech act that is governed by a specific norm – say, the K Rule or the JK Rule – then we may avoid counterexamples, but only at the cost of trivialization. More generally, the problem is to draw a principled distinction between cases in which an assertion is performed, which violates the norms of assertion, and cases in which a different speech act is performed, which does not violate the norms of assertion. In other words, there must be some non-normative account of which speech act is being performed. So, the question is whether we can give any independent account of the distinction between assertion and conjecture, which explains why these speech acts are governed by distinct norms.

In what follows, I want to propose a strategy for responding to cases of radical ignorance, which appeals to the distinction between believing a
proposition and merely having a high degree of confidence that it is true. With this distinction in hand, we can draw a corresponding distinction between acting on one’s beliefs versus acting on one’s high degree of confidence. In the same way, we can explain the distinction between assertion and conjecture as a distinction between speech acts that express one’s beliefs and speech acts that express one’s high degree of confidence.

Williamson himself invokes an analogy between assertion and belief:

Indeed, assertion is the exterior analogue of judgement, which stands to belief as act to state. Nevertheless, there is a special relationship between knowing and asserting, if the argument of this chapter is correct. By analogy, there is also a special relationship between knowing and judging or believing. The relationship is a normative one. (2000: 238)

According to my proposal, there is more than an analogy between assertion and belief. The very nature of assertion is to be understood in terms of its role in the expression of belief. Moreover, I will explain why the norms for assertion are more demanding than the norms for conjecture by appeal to the claim that the norms for belief are more demanding than the norms for high confidence. In the same way, I will explain why the norms for acting on one’s beliefs are more demanding than the norms for acting on one’s high degree of confidence. According to my proposal, the JK Rule is a normative constraint that governs all and only actions and speech acts that are performed on the basis of one’s beliefs. By contrast, in cases of radical ignorance, one merely has justification to perform speech acts and other actions on the basis of one’s degrees of confidence. In this way, I suggest, the apparent counterexamples to the JK Rule can be explained away.

4. Belief and Confidence: A Functional Distinction

How are we to understand the distinction between believing a proposition and merely having a high degree of confidence that it is true? We need an account of this distinction in order to make sense of the corresponding distinction between actions, including speech acts, that are performed on the basis of one’s beliefs versus those that are performed merely on the basis of one’s degrees of confidence. In what follows, I want to offer a functional account of the distinction between belief and having a high degree of confidence, according to which belief plays a distinctive functional role in reasoning. My starting point is a proposal from Michael Bratman:

To believe something is not merely to assign a high probability to its occurrence. I might assign a high probability to my failing to move the log without believing I will fail. On the planning theory an important difference between these two attitudes lies in their different roles in my further planning. If I merely think
failure quite likely, I am not yet in a position to plan on the basis of the assumption of failure. Normally I will go ahead and form conditional intentions both for success and for failure. In contrast, what seems distinctive about believing I will fail is that it puts me in a position to plan on the assumption of failure. (1987: 40)

Here, Bratman is discussing a case in which a log has fallen across my driveway and I am deciding what to do. We can suppose that I prefer to save money by moving it myself, although if I am unable to do so, then I will call the tree company to move it for me. Bratman’s proposal is that my beliefs play a distinctive functional role in providing a framework for my planning. For instance, if I believe that I will be unable to move the log, then I am disposed to plan on the basis of this assumption. In that case, I will form the intention to call the tree company to move the log. But if I do not believe that I will be unable to move the log, then I am not disposed to plan on the basis of this assumption, even if I am highly confident that I will be unable to move it. In that case, I will not form the intention to call the tree company, but rather the conditional intention to call the tree company if I fail to move the log myself.

More generally, whether or not one believes that P makes a functional difference in terms of one’s dispositions to give weight in practical and theoretical reasoning to premises that are obviously incompatible with P. If one is highly confident that P, but one suspends belief that P, then one will be disposed to give some weight in reasoning to the possibility that P is false. In other words, one will be disposed to reason not only from the premise that P, but also from various incompatible alternatives, where one’s degree of confidence in the conclusions of one’s reasoning is weighted in proportion to one’s degree of confidence in the premises. By contrast, if one believes that P, then one will be disposed simply to take it for granted that P as a premise in reasoning. In other words, one will be disposed to reason from the premise that P without giving any weight in reasoning to the possibility that P is false. Crucially, though, one need not be maximally confident that P is true, so long as one is sufficiently confident to ignore the possibility that P is false and not to give it any weight in reasoning.

The bank cases provide a useful illustration. In the low stakes case, one may believe that the bank will be open on Saturday and one may take this for granted in deciding to come back on Saturday, rather than waiting in line on Friday afternoon. In the high stakes case, by contrast, one may be highly confident that the bank will be open on Saturday and yet suspend belief on the matter. In that case, one is not disposed to take it for granted that the bank will be open, since one gives some weight in reasoning to the possibility that the bank has changed its hours. In each case, one may be highly confident that the bank will be open, but less than maximally confident that the bank has not changed its hours. The difference is that in
the low stakes case, but not the high stakes case, one gives some weight in reasoning to one’s small, but non-zero degree of confidence in the possibility that the bank has changed its hours.

There is an illuminating parallel to be drawn here with Bratman’s theory of intention. According to Bratman, it is not sufficient for intending to do A that one has a predominant desire to do A. Intuitively, if I intend to do A, then I am committed to doing A, whereas if I merely desire to do A, then I am not yet committed to doing A. Bratman unpacks this notion of commitment in terms of the distinctive functional role of intentions in practical reasoning: if I intend to do A, then I have settled the question whether to do A and I am disposed to take my decision to do A as the starting point for any further reasoning, whereas if I merely desire to do A, then the question whether to do A remains open. Even if my desire to do A is a predominant desire, which outweighs all my conflicting desires, I may well continue to deliberate about whether or not A is the thing to do.

Similarly, Bratman claims, it is not sufficient for believing that P that one has a high degree of confidence in P. Like intentions, beliefs involve a kind of commitment: if I believe that P, then I am committed to the truth of P, whereas if I am merely confident that P, then I am not so committed. Again, this notion of commitment may be unpacked in terms of the functional role of belief in reasoning: if I believe that P, then I have settled the question of whether or not P is true and I am disposed to take it for granted that P as a starting point for any future reasoning, whereas if I am merely confident that P is true to some less than maximal degree, then the question of whether or not P is true remains open. Even if I am highly confident that P, I may well continue to deliberate about whether or not P is true.

At this point, the question arises why it is rational to make the kinds of commitments that are characteristic of intention and belief. One might have thought that it would be more rational to keep one’s options open by reasoning on the basis of one’s credences and preferences in a way that keeps track of their changing strengths over time. Given our cognitive limitations, however, it may be simply too demanding for us to reason in a way that keeps track of the changing strengths of all our credences and preferences over time. By forming intentions and beliefs, we make deliberation tractable by narrowing down the space of options that need to be considered. Bratman puts the point as follows:

What makes my attitude towards my having just one car one of flat-out belief, and not merely the assignment of some probability somewhat less than 1, is, at least in part, its distinctive role in the background of my further planning – in particular its role in providing a screen of admissibility for my options. (1987: 37)

So far, we have only the beginnings of a functional theory of belief. It may be necessary for believing that P that one has a disposition to take it for
granted that P, but it is not sufficient. Bratman (1992) gives various examples of context-relative acceptance, in which one has practical reasons to take it for granted that P as a premise in practical reasoning, although one does not believe that P. So, belief and acceptance are alike in their functional outputs, since they ground dispositions to take their contents for granted in reasoning. Nevertheless, they differ in their functional inputs, since beliefs are formed in a way that is sensitive to the evidence, whereas acceptance is formed in a way that is sensitive to the practical considerations at issue in the context. To a first approximation, then, we might say that belief and acceptance have similar outputs, but different inputs, whereas belief and confidence have similar inputs, but different outputs.

The distinction between belief and high confidence raises a more general question about the relationship between one's beliefs and one's degrees of confidence. According to the Threshold View, what it is to believe a proposition is just for one's degree of confidence to meet a certain threshold. The Threshold View is compatible with the distinction between belief and high confidence, since one’s degree of confidence may be high, but not high enough to meet the threshold for belief. But this raises the further question: how high is high enough? On this question, there is some disagreement among proponents of the Threshold View. Some say that belief requires maximal confidence, whereas others say that it requires less than maximal confidence. Some say that the threshold for belief varies in a way that is sensitive to the context of either the subject or the attributor, whereas others say that it remains invariant, although it may be defined over a possibility space that expands and contracts in a way that is sensitive to context. Whatever the outcome of these debates, it should be constrained by an account of the functional role of belief. After all, any account of how the threshold of belief is fixed should not make it arbitrary, but should respect the theoretical significance of belief. As a minimal constraint, then, one believes a proposition if and only if one's degree of confidence is high enough, given all other relevant factors, to sustain the distinctive functional role of belief.

My aim here has been to sketch a functional distinction between doxastic attitudes of belief and high confidence. The proposal is that it is not sufficient for belief that one has a high degree of confidence in a proposition unless one is disposed to assert it and to act on it by taking it for granted in practical and theoretical reasoning. We can find some support for this distinction in ordinary language. For example, a juror in a court of law may be highly confident that the defendant is guilty, but not sufficiently confident to believe that the defendant is guilty, preferring instead to suspend belief unless further evidence becomes available. In that case, the juror will not be disposed to assert that the defendant is guilty or to act on the assumption that the defendant is guilty by taking this for granted as a premise in reasoning. However, I do not claim that our ordinary belief-talk perfectly tracks the distinction between belief and high confidence. Indeed, one common use for
belief-talk is to express the fact that one’s doxastic attitude is one of high confidence, rather than belief. This is why it seems worse to assert, ‘P, but I don’t know that P’ than to make the qualified assertion, ‘I believe that P, but I don’t know that P’. Ultimately, the distinction between belief and high confidence is motivated not by reflection on ordinary language, but rather by functionalist considerations in the philosophy of mind. The crucial point is that there is an important functional distinction to be drawn here, regardless of whether or not this distinction corresponds perfectly with our ordinary use of the English word ‘belief’.

5. Belief and Confidence: A Normative Distinction

In the previous section, I argued that there is a functional distinction between belief and high confidence, since they play different functional roles in reasoning. In this section, I will argue that there is also a normative distinction between belief and high confidence, since they are subject to different normative constraints. More specifically, I will argue that belief is subject to a version of the JK Rule, whereas high confidence is not. This supports and explains my earlier claim, in response to cases of radical ignorance, that the JK Rule applies only to actions, including speech acts, which are performed on the basis of one’s beliefs. The aim is to provide a unified account of the norms of justification that govern belief, assertion and action by explaining the norms for assertion and action by appeal to more fundamental norms for belief.

First, I will assume that the epistemic norms of justification for making assertions that express one’s beliefs and for acting on one’s beliefs are derived from the epistemic norms of justification that govern one’s beliefs themselves:

- The J Rule for assertion and action: one has justification to assert and to act on the belief that P if and only if one has justification to believe that P

Second, I will argue that a version of the JK Rule articulates a norm of justification that governs one’s beliefs, but not one’s degrees of confidence:

- The JK Rule for belief: one has justification to believe that P if and only if one has justification to believe that one is in a position to know that P

And third, from the J Rule for assertion and action together with the JK Rule for belief, we can derive the JK Rule for assertion and action:

- The JK Rule for assertion and action: One has justification to assert and to act on the belief that P if and only if one has justification to believe that one is in a position to know that P
The JK Rule for belief is motivated by the same kind of intuitive data as the JK Rule for assertion and action, including lottery, bank and barn cases.\textsuperscript{17} By contrasting each of the good cases with the corresponding bad cases, we can illustrate how one loses one’s justification to believe a proposition as soon as one loses one’s justification to believe that one is in a position to know it, although one does not thereby lose one’s justification to have a high degree of confidence in its truth. In the good cases, one has justification to take it for granted that P and to ignore the not-P possibilities, whereas in the bad cases, one merely has justification to weigh the possibility that P against the not-P possibilities.

This is perhaps clearest in the fake-barn case. In the original version, one has justification to believe that there is a barn ahead – that is, to take it for granted that there is a barn ahead and to ignore the possibility that it is a fake. Although in fact one is in fake barn country, one lacks justification to believe this and so one has justification to believe that one is in a position to know that there is a barn ahead. In the revised version, by contrast, one has testimonial justification to believe that one is in fake-barn country and so one lacks justification to believe that one is in a position to know that there is a barn ahead. As a result, one does not have justification to take it for granted that there is a barn ahead, but merely to weigh this against the possibility that it is a fake. In other words, one does not have justification to believe that there is a barn ahead, but merely to have a certain degree of confidence that it is a real barn, rather than a fake.

These intuitive points generalize to the other cases. In the low stakes bank case, one is in a position to know that the bank will be open on Saturday and moreover one has justification to believe this. So, one has justification to believe that the bank will be open – that is, to take it for granted that the bank will be open and to ignore the possibility that the bank has changed its hours. By contrast, in the high stakes bank case, one is not in a position to know that the bank will be open and one does not have justification to believe that one is. As a result, one does not have justification to take it for granted that the bank will be open, but merely to have a certain degree of confidence that it will be open. After all, one does not have justification to take it for granted that the bank will be open, but merely to weigh this against the possibility that the bank has changed its hours.

Again, in the newspaper case, one is in a position to know that one did not win the bet and moreover one has justification to believe this. So, one has justification to believe that one did not win the bet – that is, to take it for granted that one did not win the bet and to ignore the possibility that the newspaper misprinted the scores of the game. By contrast, in the lottery case, one is not in a position to know that one did not win the lottery and one lacks justification to believe that one is in such a position. As a result, one does not have justification to believe that one did not win the lottery, but merely to have a certain degree of confidence that one did not win. After
all, one does not have justification to take it for granted that one did not win the lottery, but merely to weigh this against the unlikely possibility that one is the winner.

In the lottery case, it is sometimes said that one has justification to believe that one did not win, although one lacks justification to believe that one is in a position to know that one did not win. If so, then the lottery case provides a counterexample to the JK Rule. However, there are several reasons to reject this description of the case and to say that while one has justification to be highly confident that one did not win, one lacks justification to believe that one did not win.

First, one lacks justification to assert that one did not win or to act on the assumption that one did not win by taking it for granted and ignoring the chance that one did in fact win. This intuitive datum is best explained by the hypothesis that one lacks justification to believe that one did not win, since one has justification to assert or to act on one’s belief that P if and only if one has justification to believe that P. Second, in the lottery case, one is not in a position to know that one did not win. Again, this intuitive datum is best explained by the hypothesis that one lacks justification to believe that one did not win, since, one is in a position to know that P only if one has justification to believe that P. Third, one does not have justification to believe that no ticket wins the lottery. Again, this intuitive datum is best explained by the hypothesis that one lacks justification to believe that one’s ticket did not win. If one has justification to believe that one’s ticket did not win, then by parity of reasoning, one has justification to believe of each individual ticket that it did not win. And so, by closure, one has justification to believe the absurd conclusion that no ticket wins the lottery.

The JK Rule captures an important, but widely overlooked feature of the relationship between justification and knowledge. According to the standard view, justification is necessary but not sufficient for knowledge. An unjustified belief cannot be knowledge, but a justified belief can fail to be knowledge if false, or if true, but gettiered. While this standard view seems right, as far as it goes, it does not go far enough, since it omits the most interesting aspect of the relationship between justification and knowledge. The JK Rule implies an indiscriminability thesis, according to which having justification to believe a proposition is indiscriminable from being in a position to know it. To borrow a slogan from Stephen Reynolds (2002: 151): “Justification is what knowledge looks like from the inside.”

According to one standard interpretation, a situation A is indiscriminable from a situation B just in case: if one is in A, then for all one is in a position to know, one is in B. On this interpretation, the indiscriminability thesis says that if one has justification to believe that P, then for all one is in a position to know, one is in a position to know that P. This is a consequence of the ¬K¬K Rule, which says that if one has justification to believe that P, then one is not in a position to know that one is not in a position to
know that P. However, the JK Rule sustains a stronger interpretation of the indiscriminability thesis. Let us say that a situation A is indiscriminable from a situation B just in case: if one is in A, then for all one has justification to believe, one is in B. On this alternative interpretation, the indiscriminability thesis says that if one has justification to believe that P, then for all one has justification to believe, one is in a position to know that P. And of course, this is a consequence of the JK Rule, which says that if one has justification to believe that P, then one does not have justification to believe that one is not in a position to know that P. Thus, the JK Rule implies an indiscriminability thesis, according to which having justification is indiscriminable from being in a position to know.\(^{21}\)

### 6. The Aim of Belief

It is sometimes said that knowledge is the norm of belief. However, it is not always clear what this is supposed to mean. After all, it is not clear that there is any unique norm for belief, so we need to specify which kind of norm is in question. In particular, we need to distinguish between norms of correctness and norms of justification.

The normative standard of correctness or success for an activity is set by its aim. For example, the aim of a game of soccer is to score more goals than the opposing team, so the successful team is the one that scores the most goals. However, there are norms of justification that govern an activity in addition to norms of correctness or success. So, for example, a goalkeeper might have justification to play out of his box, even if this strategy is incorrect in the sense that it leads to failure, so long as he has justification to believe that it is correct in the sense of leading to success. More generally, one has justification to conduct one's activities in such a way that one has justification to believe is correct. So, there is a general relationship between norms of justification and norms of correctness, which is given by this Linking Principle:\(^{22}\)

- The Linking Principle: one has justification to \(\varphi\) if and only if one has justification to believe that it is correct to \(\varphi\)

Belief is not an activity, or an action, but like actions and activities, it is subject to norms of justification and correctness. Knowledge is not a norm of justification for belief, since there are cases, including Gettier cases, in which one has justification to believe a proposition that one neither knows nor is positioned to know. However, there is also a norm of correctness for belief, which is set by its aim. So, if knowledge is the aim of belief, then we may conclude that knowledge is the norm of correctness for belief. As Williamson puts the point:\(^{23}\)
Knowing sets the standard of appropriateness for belief... Knowing is in that sense the best kind of believing. Mere believing is a kind of botched knowing. In short, belief aims at knowledge (not just truth).” (2000: 47)

Why should we suppose that knowledge is the aim of belief? Williamson (2000: 262) observes that there is a sense in which it is defective to believe that $P$ if one is not in a position to know that $P$. But what is the relevant notion of defectiveness? According to the JK Rule, if one has misleading justification to believe falsely that one is in a position to know that $P$, then one has justification to believe that $P$. But it may be incorrect to believe that $P$ even if has justification to falsely believe that it is correct to believe that $P$. So, we need a version of the K Rule that articulates normative standards for correctness, rather than justification, for belief:

- The K Rule for correct belief: it is correct to believe that $P$ if and only if one is in a position to know that $P$.

Standards of correctness, like standards of justification, may be formulated either as propositional or as doxastic requirements. One’s epistemic position may be such that it is correct to believe that $P$, but one correctly believes that $P$ only if one takes advantage of one’s epistemic position by believing that $P$ on the right basis. So, if it is correct to believe that $P$ if and only if one is in a position to know that $P$, then one correctly believes that $P$ if and only if one knows that $P$. In this sense, knowledge is the aim of belief.

Why should we suppose that knowledge, rather than truth, is the aim of belief? Wedgwood (2002) claims that truth is the aim of belief, which he takes to imply the following standards of correctness for belief:

- The T Rule for correct belief: it is correct to believe that $P$ if and only if it is true that $P$.

However, the T Rule fails to explain the sense in which it is defective to believe a true proposition if one is not in a position to know that it is true. By contrast, there is no purely epistemic sense in which it is defective to believe that $P$ if one is in a position to know that $P$. Thus, the K Rule captures an intuitive sense in which being in a position to know is the most comprehensive endorsement of one’s epistemic position.

A more theoretical argument for the K Rule is that it provides a deeper explanation of the standards of justification that are articulated by the JK Rule. Suppose that the standards of correctness for belief are set by the aim of knowledge, as the K Rule claims, and that we have reflective justification to believe this. In other words, one has justification to believe the following biconditional: it is correct to believe that $P$ if and only if one is in a position to know that $P$. Assuming that justification is closed over entailment, we can
distribute justification across the biconditional, which yields the following K Lemma: one has justification to believe that it is correct to believe that P if and only if one has justification to believe that one is in a position to know that P. From this K Lemma, together with the Linking Principle, we can derive the JK Rule:

1. (The Linking Principle): one has justification to believe that P if and only if one has justification to believe that it is correct to believe that P
2. (The K Lemma): one has justification to believe that it is correct to believe that P if and only if one has justification to believe that one is in a position to know that P; therefore
3. (The JK Rule): one has justification to believe that P if and only if one has justification to believe that one is in a position to know that P

By contrast, suppose that the standards of correctness for belief are set by the aim of truth, as the T Rule claims, and that we have justification to believe this. Closure yields the following T Lemma: one has justification to believe that it is correct to believe that P if and only if one has justification to believe that P is true. From the T Lemma, together with the Linking Principle, we can derive only the trivial conclusion that one has justification to believe that P if and only if one has justification to believe that P is true:

1. (The Linking Principle): one has justification to believe that P if and only if one has justification to believe that it is correct to believe that P
2. (The T Lemma): one has justification to believe it is correct to believe that P if and only if one has justification to believe that P is true; so
3. (A Triviality): one has justification to believe that P if and only if one has justification to believe that P is true

Since there is independent support for the JK Rule, we should prefer the K Rule to the T Rule, since it explains why the JK Rule is true.

7. Summary

What is the normative role of knowledge? I have argued that the intuitive data do not support a version of the K Rule on which the standard of justification for belief is being in a position to know. Rather, the intuitive data are best explained by a version of the JK Rule on which having justification to believe is indiscriminable from being in a position to know. However, the JK Rule is itself explained by a version of the K Rule on which the standard of correctness for belief is being in a position to know. The standard of correctness for belief is set by its aim, so I conclude that the aim of belief is knowledge.24
Notes


2 Here, I do not mean to commit myself on the issue of pragmatic encroachment in epistemology. I take it that even proponents of pragmatic encroachment will preserve a version of the distinction between epistemic and merely pragmatic justification, although it may be more difficult to draw sharply.

3 A similar response is available to proponents of the JK Rule (see below), since one may have justification to believe that one is in a position to know a proposition that one does not believe. Moreover, neither the K Rule nor the JK Rule incurs any commitment to the claim that one's assertion is justified only if it expresses a proposition that one believes, so there is no conflict with Lackey's claim that “it is a mistake to require proper assertion to pass through the doxastic states of the asserter” (2007: 600).

4 See Williamson (2005) for a version of this strategy and see Brown (2005) for discussion of a wider range of options available to proponents of insensitive invariantism.

5 Hawthorne and Stanley might reply that Calvin is excusable for violating norms of justification in the original version of the barn case, but not in the revised version. At this point, I suspect the disagreement is purely terminological.

6 For these arguments, see Williamson (2000: 252–4).

7 Notice that assertions of the form, “P and I don’t know that P,” or “P and I don’t believe that P” seem appropriate in Lackey’s (2007) cases of selfless assertion. These cases do involve some degree of overall irrationality, but this can be explained by the JK Rule in terms of one’s failure to believe a proposition despite the fact that one has justification to believe that one is in a position to know that position.

8 The JK Rule also promises to explain a much wider range of Moorean phenomena. See Huemer (2007) for further discussion of the role of knowledge in explaining different versions of Moore’s paradox.

9 For further discussion of the issue of psychological constraints on justification, see Feldman and Conee (1985) and Christensen (2004: Ch. 6).

10 The concept of probability is not necessary for having justification to believe that P is probable, but it is necessary for taking advantage of this justification in belief, assertion or action.

11 See Williamson (2000: Ch. 10) for an elaboration and defence of this conception of epistemic probability.

12 Knowledge requires that the evidence is believed, not merely subdoxastically represented. For example, Chomsky’s so-called “tacit knowledge” of syntactic rules is not really knowledge, since the rules in question are not believed, but merely subdoxastically represented.

13 Here, I am following Wedgwood (2008), who proposes a functionalist account of belief along very similar lines.

14 See Kaplan (1996: Ch. 3) for an overview. The Threshold View makes a psychological claim about belief, rather than a normative claim about the rationality or justification of belief, so it is distinct from Foley’s (1993: 141) Lockean thesis: “According to the Lockean thesis, it is rational for you to believe a proposition just in case it is rational for you to have a degree of confidence in that it is sufficient for belief.”

15 Compare Stalnaker (1984: 91) on the theoretical significance of acceptance: “Unless acceptance has some consequences, unless the way one classifies the propositions as accepted, rejected or judgement suspended makes a difference to how the agent behaves, or ought to behave, it is difficult to see how the concept of acceptance can have the interest and importance for enquiry that it seems to have.”

16 A referee suggested the following counterexample: I have justification to believe I am not currently asserting anything, but I do not have justification to assert this. My response is that, in the epistemic sense at issue, I do have justification to make the assertion, but my justification is
“finkish” in the sense that if I make the assertion, then my justification is destroyed. Compare: if I suspend belief about everything, I have justification to believe that I believe nothing, but if I believe this, then my justification is destroyed.

17 As before, I assume that the intuitive data are plausible, while remaining neutral on the further question of whether or not they are ultimately correct.

18 Compare Nelkin (2000), who argues for a uniform solution to the lottery paradox by denying both that one knows and that one has justification to believe that one’s ticket will lose. Foley (1993: Ch. 4) rejects closure, but see Hawthorne (2004: Ch. 1) for a recent defence of closure.

19 An exception is Sutton (2005), who argues that justification is necessary and sufficient for knowledge: in other words, one’s belief is justified if and only if it is knowledge. Williamson (2000: Ch. 9) argues that knowledge is what justifies belief, but not what gets justified, so even his view allows that some of one’s justified beliefs may not be knowledge.

21 Williamson (2000: 46–7) raises objections to the proposal that belief is indiscriminable from knowledge, but these objections do not affect my proposal, which concerns justification to believe, rather than belief.

22 Wedgwood (2002) argues that claims about the aim of belief should be understood in terms of norms of correctness, rather than justification. His distinction between correctness and justification corresponds roughly to the distinction in ethics between objective and subjective ‘oughts’. It also resembles DeRose’s (2002) distinction between primary and secondary norms and Williamson’s (2000: 243–5, 256–7) distinction between warrant and reasonableness.


References


